The Return of Patriarchy and the Rise of Conservative Society!!!
Posted by Steve Turley ● Aug 22, 2018 11:59:41 PM
Phillip Longman of ForeignPolicy.com has an excellent article on the rising birthrates among conservatives throughout the world, but particularly Europe and the United States, and what that means for the rising of a conservative age in our midst. And I owe a debt of gratitude to one of our VIP Patrons, Rob Scovell for sharing this article with me, which I will link here for your reference. https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/20/the-return-of-patriarchy/
As you know, I am very interested in a worldwide phenomenon that scholars call retraditionalization. What scholars have noticed is that in the face of threats to a sense of place, identity, and security so often posed by globalization, populations tend to reassert historic identity and security markers – religion, custom, and tradition – as mechanisms of resistance against secular globalization’s anti-cultural, anti-traditional dynamics. Scholars are increasingly noting that as people feel vulnerable and experience existential anxiety, it’s not uncommon for them to re-assert their customs, traditions, culture, language, and ethnicity as bulwarks against threats to their sense of existential security.
Perhaps no traditional institution is going through this kind of renewal, this kind of retraditionalization, MORE than the traditional family. The actual application of the notion of retraditionalization has been the subject of some very interesting research on ethnic enclaves, ethnic minorities in Kyrgystan, where the researchers found that the more such minorities felt threatened by the cultural pressures of the wider ethnic majority, the more they turned to procreation and fertility as the primary means of resisting such pressures.
What Longman gets into is the wider implications of the return of patriarchy for particularly European demography. Now, by patriarchy, Longman does not mean simply that men rule; that now men are the bosses in every area of life and women need to remain content bunkering up in the kitchen. Instead, patriarchy is, simply put, a value system that requires men to marry and in turn maximize their investment in the lives of their children. Patriarchy is a value system that requires men to marry, or at least expects men to marry and to maximize their involvement in the lives of their children. As Longman points out, while patriarchy may have its modern day, contemporary critics, feminist-postmodern-cultural Marxist critics, I think he rightly points out that, whatever else you want to say about it, the simple fact is that no advanced civilization has yet learned how to endure without it. In short, regardless of its detractors, patriarchy is historically speaking, and I would even add logically speaking, a necessary precondition for social and cultural flourishing.
The critics of patriarchy actually have a little something they need to answer for, and that is the rather inconvenient fact that the feminist and countercultural movements of the 1960s and 70s that have been so up in arms against patriarchy, they are not leaving any genetic legacy. They are basically disappearing off the face of the earth. For example, Longman cites a very interesting statistic. While only 11 percent of baby boomer women had four or more children, those children made up over 25 percent of the total children born to baby boomers; so 11 percent of women are having 25 percent of the children, and that is because so many of their secular counterparts had only one child or no children. Again, conversely, the 20 percent of baby boomer women who had only one child accounted for a mere 7 percent of the total children born to baby boomers.
I think you are going to really like the conclusion Longman comes to from data like this. Here is what Longman writes; this fertility discrepancy is “leading to the emergence of a new society [does that sound familiar? The emergence of a new society] whose members will disproportionately be descended from parents who rejected the social tendencies that once made childlessness and small families the norm. These values include an adherence to traditional, patriarchal religion, and a strong identification with one’s own folk or nation.”
Now, Longman notes that this demographic dynamic helps explain, for example, what he calls the gradual shift of American culture away from secular individualism and towards what he calls “religious fundamentalism,” I think we would use more the phrase ‘religious traditionalism,’ but nevertheless. And he notes that among states that voted for President George W. Bush in 2004, the fertility rates in those states, these what we call red states, are 12 percent higher than in states that voted for Sen. John Kerry. The London demographer Eric Kaufmann notes something similar here, where he found that conservative Christians had a 30 percent fertility advantage over their secular counterparts.
Across the pond, another example Longman cites is from France, where only about 30 percent of women have three or more children, but they are responsible for over 50 percent of all children born in France. Thirty percent of French woman are responsible for 50 percent of all births, and again, this is because their secular counterparts are having either only one child or none at all.Longman also notes that this demographic discrepancy may account, at least partially, for why Europeans are beginning more and more to reject what he calls the crown jewel of secular liberalism, the European Union. This is because, as it turns out, those Europeans who are most likely to identify themselves as "world citizens" and globalists are also those least likely to have children. He cites some data from demographers that found that if you have values and attitudes that do not really care about nation, culture, custom, and tradition, that you are really enthusiastic about alternative lifestyles and feminism and the like, that you are far less likely to get married and have kids than those who revere and love their nation, culture, customs, and traditions.
And so, in Europe and the States, we are finding that how many children different people have, and under what circumstances, actually correlates very strongly with their beliefs on a wide range of political and cultural attitudes. When all is said and done: Conservatives are having children and liberals are not.
As it turns out, particularly here in the States and in Europe, a disproportionate amount of the burgeoning population is being born to conservative, traditionalist, and nationalist families. Furthermore, we have studies that confirm that the more conservative the family, the more likely that the children will retain that conservatism when they become adults. And we even have evidence that liberal children are more likely to become conservatives in their adult years than the other way around, by about a 21 to 15 percent differential.. It really is quite stunning to say the least.
While it is quite wonderful to see nations such as Poland, Hungary, and Russia actively reversing their demographic declines with very deliberate and intentional pro-family policies and programs, it is just as heartening to see that the natural conservative family is growing at an organic level as well. Thus, whether we are dealing with nations that are proactively attempting to revitalize the family or nations that are not, regardless, the traditional family is reawakening all around us, reminding us all that in the end, it is faithful conservatives that will inherit the earth.